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INTRODUCTION


1

3
4

133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin1 (“Fisher II”) is the
quintessential proof that past is prologue. Forty years ago, the
affirmative action jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court was born out of a close interweaving of public sector higher
education with private sector employment in, respectively,
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke2 and United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber.3 The Bakke and Weber
dynamic has controlled the evolution of affirmative action in the
courts ever since.
As Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter often counseled,
the history of the law is in large measure the history of
procedure. In DeFunis v. Odegaard,4 the Supreme Court invoked
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Id. at 316, 320.
134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
7
The scholar whose position comes closest to the position of this Article is
probably Professor Randall Kennedy, a prominent African-American professor at
Harvard Law School. See Randall Kennedy, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW (Pantheon Books ed., 2013); Stuart Taylor Jr.,
Book Review: ‘For Discrimination’ by Randall Kennedy, WALL ST. J.,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324165204579026632266964524
(last updated Aug. 30, 2013, 4:22 PM).
6
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nonjusticiability and remanded the substantially, but perhaps
not entirely, moot DeFunis case to the majoritarian political
process.5 A half decade later, the Court promulgated the Bakke
and Weber architecture that governs to this day.
Fisher II, for all practical purposes, may be the functional
equivalent of the DeFunis case forty years ago. Likewise,
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action6 may be the
broad analog to Bakke and Weber.
This Article critically analyzes the dimensions and likely
ramifications of Fisher and Schuette. The principle of pragmatic
political proportionality eschews the wholly ideological extremist
views that would either utterly vitiate affirmative action or
deeply embed it as a substantially obsolete elitist residue of
endless recalibrating.
Instead, this Article subscribes to
Lincolnian practical wisdom supplemented with a healthy dose of
plain common sense.7 Enlightened political leadership should
seek achievable pragmatic proportionality as the guiding
principle controlling access to public institutions of higher
education and, consequently, entry into the professions.
Although affirmative action in higher education and in
employment under Title VII has evolved differently, the salient
Court decisions have been closely interwoven. With these most
recent Court decisions opening the door, there are likely to be
future challenges to affirmative action. The Court suggests that
there is a compelling need for proponents to justify their
affirmative action policies. This resurrects the classic confluence
of the standards for affirmative action in higher education and
under Title VII. The future of affirmative action is again up for
debate. The problem that affirmative action is designed to
remedy—educational disparity among different groups—could be
addressed by measures to enhance the educational system at the
primary level. More closely calibrating resources to primary
school education would seem to be money better spent.
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To withstand the judicial strict scrutiny applied to
affirmative action, a university must show that its race conscious
policy is narrowly tailored to support a compelling state interest.8
As the Court reiterated in Fisher II, the means to implement this
compelling interest must be narrowly tailored. “[T]he University
must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain
diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal. On this point, the
University receives no deference.”9
The requirement that the university must narrowly tailor its
goals to show that affirmative action measures are necessary
presents an especially difficult problem: “Narrow tailoring also
requires that the reviewing court verify that it is ‘necessary’ for a
university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of
diversity.”10 How does one prove that it is necessary to use race?
It is easier said than done, especially in light of Fisher II.
In Fisher II, the Court held the following:
In order for judicial review to be meaningful, a university must
make a showing that its plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the
only interest that this Court has approved in this context: the
benefits of a student body diversity that “encompasses
a . . . broa[d] array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important
element.”11


8

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013).
10
Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978)).
11
Id. at 2421 (alteration in original) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).
12
Id. at 2416.
13
Id. at 2415.
9
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When this holding is read alone, it seems that Texas had
done what was required. The 2004 proposal and the creation of
the many iterations of affirmative action show that the
university has tried to narrowly tailor their plan.12 Race is only
considered as one factor of the Personal Achievement Index
(“PAI”) score, which is only considered if the applicant has not
been accepted under the Top Ten Percent Plan.13 What the Court
presented has left a wall that is too high to realistically
overcome. The Court punted in the outcome of Fisher, and the
remand to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit left Fisher essentially in the same place as before it was
decided. The most recent affirmative action case, Schuette v.

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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Coalition to End Affirmative Action,14 will not settle this
uncertainty with race-conscious policies and may bring more
constitutional challenges.
The Court’s decision in Fisher II has spurred greater
uncertainty in the law. Ensuring a court could be satisfied that
“no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the
educational benefits of diversity”15 is very difficult. Perhaps the
money spent on litigating affirmative action suits16 could be
better spent on targeted recruitment strategies and financial aid
incentives tailored to low-income students. In Schuette, the State
of Michigan has effectively eliminated its laboratory for
experimenting with affirmative action by enacting Proposal 2
(“Prop 2”), now § 26, of the Michigan State Constitution.17 By
upholding this amendment, the Court has given other states a
way around affirmative action, but this could be to the detriment
of the states. Whether the effects of diversity as a compelling
state interest are still a part of the discussion will remain to be
seen and has already led to the return of Fisher II to the Court.
I. THE FOUNDATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL EDUCATION AND IN
EMPLOYMENT
A.

DeFunis v. Odegaard


14
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04/08/2016 13:04:55

134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
16
See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Texas Taps Mahoney, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Apr. 28, 2012, 9:33 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/04/28/texas-tapsmahoney; Justin Marion, How Costly is Affirmative Action? Government Contracting
and California’s Proposition 209, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 503 (2009),
http://people.ucsc.edu/~marion/Papers/Prop209_oct2007_revision.pdf.
17
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629.
18
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974).
19
Id.
15
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In 1971, Marco DeFunis, a white male, applied, and was
denied admission to the University of Washington Law School.18
The admissions committee used different procedures and criteria
DeFunis,
to evaluate minorities versus nonminorities.19
contending that the admissions committee’s criteria and
procedures insidiously discriminated against him based on race
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Id.
Id. at 315.
22
Justice Douglas was a Washington State native. He had also survived the
1970 impeachment proceedings brought against him for his liberal positions on
controversial issues which he detailed in his two-volume memoirs. See generally
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS (Random House
ed., 1st ed. 1974); WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939–1975, (Random
House ed., 1st ed. 1980).
23
DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24
Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting). There were twenty-six amicus briefs filed
in DeFunis. One hundred twenty-three amicus briefs were filed in Fisher II.
25
Id.
26
Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013) (holding that the appellate court
applied the wrong level of scrutiny in upholding the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment).
27
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–6, Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345).
21
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in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, brought suit in a
Washington trial court.20 The Court granted certiorari while
DeFunis was in his final year of law school.21
In a five-to-four per curiam decision, the Court held that the
case was moot because DeFunis would complete his studies at
the law school by the end of the academic term independent of
any decision the Court would reach. In his dissent, Justice
Douglas22 asserted that, instead of being selected by cultural
background, minorities “should be chosen on talent and character
alone.”23 Additionally, Justice Brennan stated that by dismissing
the case as moot, the Court “disserve[d] the public interest.”24
The Court should not “transform principles of avoidance of
constitutional decisions into devices for sidestepping resolution of
difficult cases.”25
DeFunis is a landmark affirmative action case, primarily
because it was the first occasion in which the Court considered a
claim regarding race in the context of public university
admissions policies. This decision indirectly became foundational
for future “reverse discrimination” challenges of racial preference
programs. By failing to reach the merits on the basis of
mootness, the Court implicitly signaled the sensitivity and the
difficulties of the issues. Similarly, Fisher II sidestepped a
resolution on the merits.26 The issue of possible mootness
recurred in Fisher II during oral arguments. Justices Sotomayor
and Ginsburg probed Fisher’s counsel to demonstrate that there
was an injury.27 The underlying difference may be the way the
plaintiff’s injunctions were treated in the lower courts. The state
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trial court granted DeFunis an injunction, and by the time the
dispute reached the Court, DeFunis was about to graduate.28
The DeFunis Court perceived this as a no harm, no foul instance.
In contrast, when Fisher sought an injunction compelling her
admission to University of Texas, it was denied.29 Thus, she was
never enrolled and went instead to Louisiana State University.
Therefore, Fisher’s only injury was the application fee and the
theoretical difference in job opportunities available to her as a
nongraduate of the University of Texas. Finally, there is the
issue of the fractured decision that resulted when ruling on the
basis of Article III grounds. In a five-to-four split, the DeFunis
majority signed their decision per curiam.30 The anonymity may
indicate an underlying fear of becoming the next Justice Taney in
legal history.
B.

Regents of University of California v. Bakke

Allan Bakke,31 a white male, was denied admission to the
University of California Davis School of Medicine.32 The medical
school distinguished between underrepresented minority
applicants and nonminority applicants and relied on a quota by
reserving sixteen of one hundred seats in the incoming class for


28

DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 314–15.
Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (noting that the trial court granted summary
judgment for the university).
30
The Court does not generally omit the name of the Justice penning the
decision. In most instances, per curiam decisions are very brief, unanimous, and on
uncontroversial topics. In DeFunis, the opinion was none of those things.
31
Bakke was a thirty-seven-year-old mechanical engineer with stellar
qualifications. Not only did he have n ROTC background, but he also showed drive
and determination to attend medical school by taking night science classes to
qualify. He had a 3.46 grade point average (“GPA”), with ninety-six percent verbal
and ninety-four percent quantitative scores on the MCAT. Goodwin Liu, The
Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2002).
32
Bakke had applied twice before and was rejected on both occasions before he
brought an action against the medical school. He was never waitlisted. When his
first application was rejected, there were four special admissions seats unfilled at
the time, but Bakke was not considered. After this first rejection, Bakke protested
the special admissions program by writing a letter to the chairman of the admissions
committee, alleging the program operated as both a racial and ethnic quota. In both
years in which Bakke was rejected, other applicants were admitted to the medical
school under the special admissions program with GPAs, MCAT scores, and
benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke’s. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272–78 (1978); Liu, supra note 31.
29
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minorities.33 Bakke alleged that the special admissions program
distinguishing between minority and nonminority students
discriminated on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, the California State Constitution, and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34
Justice Powell’s plurality opinion was the most influential
opinion issued from the fractured Court. Relying upon the
“Harvard Plan,” a diversity enhancing admissions plan Harvard
College has used for decades, he opined that using quotas was
illegal, but schools may consider race as one admissions factor.35
Bakke therefore was entitled admission to the medical school
because the medical school could not show that he would not
have been admitted in the absence of the special admissions
program.36 There were six separately authored opinions with no
more than four Justices concurring in their reasoning on any
point. Five agreed that Bakke should be admitted, yet a different
group of five agreed that a public school might constitutionally
consider race in admissions under certain circumstances.37 This
was the first time the Court addressed the constitutional issue of
race when admitting students to a public university. The Court
set the groundwork for Fisher II, which reaffirmed Bakke,
holding that under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment racial preferences must be examined
with the “most exacting” strict scrutiny, that diversity was a
compelling state interest, and that educators are in the best
position to determine the policies to effectuate this goal.38

C M
Y K
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33
The two admissions programs used by the medical school were the regular
admissions program and the special admissions program. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273.
34
Id. at 277–78.
35
Id. at 316–20.
36
Id. at 320.
37
Id. at 271–72. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal
Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864 (1979)
(exploring possible theoretical ramifications of the Bakke decision and examining the
Bakke decision for broader themes in constitutional law including equal protection,
procedural fairness, and structural justice); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92
HARV. L. REV. 57, 131–48 (1978) (describing the holding and discussing the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, 55 SUP.
CT. REV. 1 (2003) (critiquing the Court’s decision in Bakke).
38
Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417–19, 21 (2013); id. at 2422 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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The greatest difference between these cases is the division of
the Court itself. Bakke is notorious for its fractured decision and
it is virtually impossible to derive overarching rules of law from
the many opinions; the most heavily relied upon is the plurality
opinion of Justice Powell. Bakke left lower courts with little to
work with, because Justice Powell’s opinion did not specify the
circumstances under which race may be considered and only
provided broad language to be interpreted. The Fisher II Court
reinforced Bakke in a seven-to-one decision and reaffirmed the
application of strict scrutiny.
C.

United Steelworkers of America v. Weber

Brian Weber, a white male, and several white coworkers,
applied for and were denied places in a company training
program, which trained employees for skilled craft positions.39
Pursuant to a master collective bargaining agreement between
the United Steelworkers of America (“USWA”) and Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp (“Kaiser”), Kaiser implemented a
training program for current employees for craft positions.40
Trainees were selected on the basis of seniority; half of the
available positions were reserved for blacks.41
The Court
described the selection process for the plan as follows:


39

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 199 (1979).
Id.
41
Kaiser’s purpose for this program was “to eliminate conspicuous racial
imbalances in Kaiser’s then almost exclusively white craft-work forces.” Id. at 198.
Kaiser and USWA voluntarily adopted the program. The program was temporary
and sought to increase the number of black workers to meet the level of the local
labor force. According to the employer, when this goal was met, the program would
be eliminated. Specifically, at the plant where the litigation arose, prior to 1974,
only 1.83% of the skilled craft workers were black, even though the local workforce
was approximately 39% black. Id. at 198–99, 208–09.
42
Id. at 199.
40
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During 1974, the first year of the operation of the Kaiser-USWA
affirmative action plan, 13 craft trainees were selected from
Gramercy’s production work force. Of these, seven were black
and six white. The most senior black selected into the program
had less seniority than several white production workers whose
bids for admission were rejected.42

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 60 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_GREGORY

508

4/6/2016 4:03 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:499

Weber instituted a class action lawsuit in federal district court on
behalf of white production workers with greater seniority than
those black workers admitted to the program. He contended that
the program discriminated on the basis of race in violation of
Title VII.43
The Court held that the Title VII prohibition of racial
discrimination does not prohibit the use of affirmative action in
all private and voluntary programs.44 Instead, the Court found
that Kaiser’s affirmative action plan under the collective
bargaining agreement that reserved fifty percent of the training
program openings for black employees until the percentage of
black craft workers was comparable with the percentage of
blacks in the labor force did not violate Title VII.45 The Court
reasoned that the program was permissible because the plan
reflected the purpose of Title VII, it did not “unnecessarily
trammel the interests of the white employees,”46 was only “a
temporary measure,”47 and intended simply “to eliminate a
manifest racial imbalance.”48
Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that the Court
usurped the role of the legislature, and that its decision was
Justice
contrary to the explicit language of Title VII.49
Rehnquist’s dissent quoted 198450 to emphasize the dramatic
leap the Court took to reach its decision when interpreting the
language of the statute and the application of Title VII to
Education and
employer-sponsored training programs.51
employment are interwoven. Without being trained to perform a
43

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 208.
45
Id. at 209.
46
Id. at 208.
47
Id. at 209.
48
Id. at 208–09.
49
Id. at 216 (Burger, J., dissenting).
50
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, (Signet Classic 1950).
51
Weber, 443 U.S. at 219–20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see George Schatzki,
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber: An Exercise in Understandable Indecision,
56 WASH. L. REV. 51, 51, 53, 73 (1980) (discussing the factors to consider when
designing an affirmative action program in the workplace); see also Philip P.
Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1169 (2000) (examining the Weber
decision retrospectively and its impact on the development of affirmative action
policies); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 62, 253 (1979) (arguing
that although the Court attempted to find a practical solution to compliance
problems in Title VII, the Court went too far in approving voluntary affirmative
action programs in the workplace).
44
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job, an employee cannot ascend the employment ladder.
Deficient job skills resulted in lower pay, as pointed out by the
plaintiffs in both Weber and Fisher II in their challenges to their
respective programs.52
Unlike Fisher II, Weber did not rely on Bakke. Comparing
Weber and Bakke may elucidate this difference. First, because
Bakke involved a state university and raised the question of
whether race-conscious programs violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, much of the Court’s decision was grounded in
constitutional analysis. Second, Weber challenged a private
employer’s voluntary and temporary use of a program
considering race in admissions to a craft program and thus was
based on Title VII.
II. THE EXPANSION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
IN THE REAGAN ERA
A.

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education



C M
Y K
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52
Weber argued that by not entering into the craft-training program, he would
not be able to hold a craft position in the plant and thus would not receive higher
wages. Weber, 443 U.S. at 199–200. Fisher argued that if she had obtained a
University of Texas degree, she would have enjoyed more job opportunities. Fisher
II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2413 (2013).
53
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270 (1986).
54
Id. at 271.
55
Id. at 276.
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In Wygant, a collective bargaining agreement between a
school district and the teachers’ union provided that, in the event
of layoffs, teachers with the most seniority would be retained, but
there would not be “a greater percentage of minority personnel
laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel
employed at the time of the layoff.”53 When the district failed to
follow the agreement, minority nontenured teachers, laid off
rather than senior tenured nonminority teachers, along with the
union, sued in federal court.54
The Court held that strict scrutiny applied, but neither
societal discrimination nor the role-model theory constituted
Justices Powell, Burger, and
compelling state interests.55
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56
57
58

60
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59

Id. at 283–84.
Id. at 294 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 295 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 296 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 301–02.
Id.
Id. at 302–03.
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Rehnquist further held that the agreement was not narrowly
tailored to effectuate the parties’ goals because less intrusive
methods, like hiring goals, were available.56
Justices White and O’Connor concurred, opining that it was
impermissible to achieve racial diversity in hiring by firing
whites in lieu of blacks until a permissible number of blacks were
reached.57 The agreement was not sufficiently tailored because it
was tied to the number of minority students, which had no
correlation to employment discrimination.
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented,
arguing that the majority had erred because it had confused
unfairness with constitutional injury.58 The Court had not yet
adopted strict scrutiny as the standard. Even if that was the
standard adopted, the agreement did not violate the Constitution
because remedying past discrimination is a compelling state
interest. In addition, the agreement was a narrowly tailored
means to achieve the compelling state interest because it equally
apportioned the burden between the racial groups, and because it
was reached through the bargaining process.
Wygant is one of the first cases in which strict scrutiny
appears in the form it exists in today: Race conscious policies are
appropriate only when there is a compelling state interest and
the means used to effectuate that interest are narrowly tailored.
Strict scrutiny still did not command a steadfast majority.
Indeed, Justice Marshall disagreed that strict scrutiny was the
proper test.59 Justice Marshall endorsed a much less rigorous
standard.60 Minimally, four Justices agreed in Wygant that strict
scrutiny is the correct standard. The dissenters acknowledged
the precedential value of strict scrutiny.61 Fisher II is an
affirmation of Powell’s vision: Strict scrutiny is the way to
validate race-conscious policies and in Fisher, the Court achieved
unanimity in equal protection jurisprudence.
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Piscataway

The situation involving the Piscataway Board of Education
may be the most memorable equal protection case that never
was.62 The distinction between Wygant and the Piscataway
settlement is that the former was a layoff case while Piscataway
was a hiring case.63 Is the denial of benefits based on race or the
extension of benefits based on race more egregious to the
Constitution?
There is no clear answer.
Fisher involved
university admissions, which could be either an extension or
denial of benefits based on race, which raises philosophical
questions about higher education in America. One common
refrain in American society is that college is the path to success.
The federal government ostensibly endorses this view.64 At the
same time, universities have a finite number of seats and there is
no inherent right to higher education. In addition, many people
now criticize the higher education complex for failing heavily
indebted students.65 If the higher education system is so badly
broken, then denial of admission does not seem so injurious.
However, if everyone should receive a college education, then
denial of college admission is potentially a constitutional injury
of great magnitude.
C.

Johnson v. Transportation Agency
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62
See Elizabeth Hull, Out on a Lonely Limb: The Piscataway Board of
Education’s Fight for Educational Diversity, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L.
407, 422–23 (2000) (discussing the Piscataway settlement in light of Wygant).
63
Id.
64
Matt Taibbi, Ripping Off Young America: The College-Loan Scandal, ROLLING
STONE (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/ripping-off-youngamerica-the-college-loan-scandal-20130815.
65
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010),
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-stateunion-address.
66
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620–21 (1987).
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The Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County instituted
a plan that “provides that, in making promotions to positions
within a traditionally segregated job classification in which
women have been significantly underrepresented, the Agency is
authorized to consider as one factor the sex of a qualified
applicant.”66 Paul Johnson, a male employee, sued.
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Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and Blackmun
held the promotion plan was constitutional.67
Employers
adopting race conscious hiring policies need not show actual past
discrimination but merely traditional underrepresentation.68 The
plan did not consider sex dispositive, as it was taken into account
with other factors. The Court’s decision did not foreclose other
voluntary programs that employers can create to benefit
disadvantaged groups.
Justice O’Connor concurred in the
judgment but wrote separately “because the Court has chosen to
follow an expansive and ill-defined approach to voluntary
Justice Scalia
affirmative action by public employers.”69
authored the dissent, excoriating the Court for ensuring that sex
would be the basis for employment decisions.70
Johnson is quite distinct from Fisher II; the application of
sex rather than of race means that strict scrutiny analysis was
not implicated in Johnson. The majority in Johnson noted that
traditional underrepresentation can be the basis for policies that
seek to expand minority presence—here, females—in a given
field.71 However, this is somewhat irrelevant to strict scrutiny
analysis, especially after Fisher II, since strict scrutiny has been
further refined.
D. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.


67
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Id. at 641–42.
Id. at 630.
69
Id. at 648 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
70
Id. at 658 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71
Id. at 630 (majority opinion).
72
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477–78 (1989). To qualify
as an MBE, the business must have been at least fifty-one percent owned and
controlled by citizens who were “Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts.” Id. at 478.
68
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The Richmond City Council mandated that general
contractors who were awarded construction contracts were
required to reserve thirty percent of the contract’s value for
subcontractors who were also minority business entities
(“MBE”).72 This set-aside program was designed to promote
minorities’ business ventures in public construction projects. In
implementing this plan, Richmond relied on a study which
showed that Richmond’s population was 50% black, yet only
0.67% of the city’s contracts had been awarded to MBE’s between
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Id. at 479–80.
Id.
75
Id. at 505 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533–35 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
76
Id. at 483–84.
77
Id. at 485.
78
Id. at 485–86.
79
Id. at 486.
80
Id. at 493.
81
Id. at 499.
82
Id. at 505.
74
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1978 and 1983.73 Also, the city contractor associations had a
limited number of minority businesses as members.74 The city
relied on Fullilove v. Klutznick to adopt the ordinance.75
The district court upheld Richmond’s set-aside plan, and was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, also relying on Fullilove v. Klutznick.76 The Court
granted certiorari but remanded the case for further
consideration after Wygant, whereupon the Fourth Circuit held
that the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.77 The Fourth Circuit held that broad
findings of past discrimination did not justify this set-aside, and
that thirty percent was not narrowly tailored.78 Richmond
appealed; with an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the Court
affirmed.79
Justice O’Connor wrote that strict scrutiny must be applied
to all race-conscious measures, even benign ones; without using
strict scrutiny, it was impossible to ascertain whether racial
classifications were benign or produced by insidious racial
Richmond relied on generalized past
discrimination.80
discrimination, and the Court held that “an amorphous claim
that there has been discrimination in a particular industry
cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.”81 A city may
only dismantle local discriminatory practices if it is shown that
they have become a passive participant in a systematic exclusion
of minorities.
Here, Richmond “failed to demonstrate a
compelling interest in apportioning public contracting
opportunities on the basis of race.”82
Both Fisher II and Croson were brought under of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In both, the Court used strict scrutiny to
evaluate the race-based policies. In Croson, there were no
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race-neutral measures attempted to increase minority contracts
awarded by the city, even though it was shown that bond
requirements hindered minority subcontractors.83
The Court’s holding in Fisher II that “[t]he reviewing court
must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of
diversity”84 is a natural extension of the race-neutral alternatives
first articulated in Croson.
The lack of deference to the
generalized legislative intent in Croson is similar to the dynamic
in Fisher II where the case was remanded to “assess whether the
University has offered sufficient evidence that would prove that
its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the
educational benefits of diversity.”85 In Fisher II, the Court
stated, “the mere recitation of a ‘benign’ or legitimate purpose for
a racial classification is entitled to little or no weight.”86 Whether
there was enough evidence in the record to be more than a “mere
recitation” was remanded to the Fifth Circuit.87 Interestingly,
Croson, which was seen as only applying to state or local actions
in light of Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, has suddenly become
relevant again in light of Fisher.88
E.

Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC
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Id. at 482.
Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013).
85
Id. at 2421.
86
Id. (quoting Richmond, 488 U.S. at 500) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87
Id. at 2421–22.
88
See generally Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the
Application of Strict Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 679 (1995); John
Galotto, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 508 (1993);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against
Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1609 (1990).
89
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990).
90
Id. at 553.
84
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Metro Broadcasting was a consolidation of two federal cases
that challenged the policies of the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) under the Equal Protection Clause of the
The FCC was granted authority by
Fifth Amendment.89
Congress in the Communications Act of 1934 to implement
policies to increase diversity in broadcasting, and, thus, increase
the dissemination of information from a variety of sources.90 To
increase the minority ownership in broadcasting, the FCC gave
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Id. at 554.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 564–65.
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 567–69.
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an enhancement wider credit for ownership and participation by
members of minority groups, both in applications for new
broadcast licenses and in “distress sales” of licenses.91 Whether
this violated the equal protection rights under the Fifth
Amendment was considered in light of the congressional support
for the objectives of the FCC.
The Court held that the FCC policies were constitutional,
since they had “the imprimatur of longstanding congressional
support” and were “substantially related to the achievement of
the important governmental objective of broadcast diversity.”92
Benign minority preference programs of the FCC were
constitutional when sustained through intermediate scrutiny
under the equal protection right of the Fifth Amendment.93 The
Court held that Fullilove did not impose strict scrutiny on the
program, and distinguished Fullilove from Croson, noting that
Croson only applied to state and local government actions.94 The
Court adopted intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard
for assessing federal “benign” racial classifications.95
The
majority—Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens—held that an interest in enhancing diversity in the
broadcast industry was an important government objective and
the FCC achieved that objective through substantially related
These programs promoted increased minority
means.96
participation rather than simply remedying past discrimination,
which was an unprecedented expansion.
The Court gave
deference to congressional objectives of enhancing diversity in
broadcasting, accepting that it was an important government
objective and the FCC’s polices were substantially related to the
achievement of diversity.97
Justice O’Connor argued for strict scrutiny in all racial
classifications and that the compelling interest should be
remedying past racial discrimination, something which was not

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 64 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_GREGORY

516

4/6/2016 4:03 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:499

shown by the FCC.98 This case was later overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,99 which held that strict scrutiny must
be applied to federal laws with benign racial classifications.100
The Court’s deference to the FCC’s stated purposes in Metro
Broadcasting is similar to the Court’s deference to the
university’s collective judgment in Fisher II. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to fully reconcile Metro Broadcasting with Fisher II, as
Metro Broadcasting was overturned in favor of using strict
scrutiny on all instances of racial classifications.101
III. AMBIVALENCE
A.

Hopwood v. Texas


98
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Id. at 611–12 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
100
Id. at 227.
101
Id.
102
Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood IV), 236 F.3d 256, 260–61 (5th Cir. 2000).
103
Id. at 263.
104
Id. at 265.
105
Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood I), 861 F.Supp. 551, 578–79 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
106
Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood II), 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996).
99
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Cheryl Hopwood, Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliot, and
David Rogers were white applicants denied admission to the
1992 entering class at the University of Texas School of Law.102
The plaintiffs challenged the law school’s affirmative action
admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and claimed that they were subjected to
unconstitutional discrimination in the application process.103 The
school admitted applicants based on a number of qualifications,
including their Texas Index (“TI”) score, LSAT score, and
undergraduate grade point average (“GPA”).104
The plaintiffs brought suit in the Western District of Texas,
where the court held that the school violated the Equal
Protection Clause because the admissions program was not
sufficiently tailored to achieve the compelling interests of having
a diverse student body and remedying past discriminatory effects
on minorities.105 The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for
further proceedings, noting that the usage of discrimination
based on race was highly suspect.106 On remand, the district
court held that the applicants were not entitled to damages, but
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114

Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood III), 999 F. Supp. 872, 923–24 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
Hopwood IV, 236 F.3d at 273–75.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322, 343–44 (2003).
Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 944, 952.
Id. at 944–46, 949, 952, 955.
Id. at 947–48.
Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013).
Id. at 2415–16.
Id.
Id.
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entered a permanent injunction proscribing consideration of race
in the school’s admission process and awarded attorney fees to
the applicants.107 Once again on appeal, the Fifth Circuit struck
down the program and held that the government had not shown
any compelling interests sufficient to justify the racially
discriminatory admissions program.108
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving the Fifth
Circuit’s holding as binding precedent until Grutter v. Bollinger
trumped Hopwood IV.109
The Fifth Circuit held that diversity was not a compelling
state interest for using racial classifications in admissions,
rejecting Justice Powell’s arguments in Bakke, and ruled that
any remedial justification for affirmative action had to be based
on discriminatory actions by the law school.110 Considering race
for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body was not a
justifiable use of race; the law school’s methods did not withstand
By holding one race as more befitting
strict scrutiny.111
admission over another nonpreferred group, the school
undermined the Equal Protection Clause,112 which halted racial
preferences in the Fifth Circuit until Grutter.
Hopwood IV was the impetus for the Top Ten Percent
Plan.113 After Grutter, the University of Texas (“UT”) system
supplemented the Top Ten Percent Plan with the Personal
Achievement Index (“PAI”) at issue in Fisher II.114 Unlike the
Texas Index score used in Hopwood IV, the PAI in Fisher II
allowed the admissions officer to consider each applicant as an
individual, with race being just a portion of the application.115
The Texas Index singled out minorities for special review to the
exclusion of whites.116 After the implementation of the holistic
PAI, minority enrollment in the UT system dropped and the
university was forced to expand outreach programs and other
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means to reach minority students.117
However, when the
university considered factors such as growing up in a nonEnglish speaking home, coupled with the operation of the Top
Ten Percent Plan, it resulted in a more racially diverse
environment at the university, even more so than before
Hopwood IV.118
IV. THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CASES
The United States Supreme Court issued two opinions on
June 23, 2003 that altered the landscape of affirmative action in
university admissions. In Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice O’Connor
held for the Court that the University of Michigan Law School
could use race as a nonnumeric “plus factor[]” in admissions
decisions.119 In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court held that the
University of Michigan could not reduce race to a numeric value
In Grutter, Justice
to be used in admissions decisions.120
O’Connor famously wrote that “[w]e expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today.”121
A.

Grutter v. Bollinger


117
118
119
120
121
122

124
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123

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2416.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255, 275–76 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 326–27.
Id. at 326.
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The elite University of Michigan Law School sought a
diverse mix of students.122 The admissions policy specifically
sought a “critical mass” of students from underrepresented racial
minority groups.123 This policy was challenged, and the Court
held that strict scrutiny applied.124 The admissions policy was
constitutional only if the government had a compelling state
interest that it sought to satisfy through narrowly tailored
means.125 “[T]he Law School ha[d] a compelling interest in
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attaining a diverse student body.”126 Namely, classroom diversity
is important because the country should “cultivate a set of
leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.”127
The narrow tailoring prong was also satisfied.128 Quotas
were impermissible, but a plan that used race as a plus factor
was permissible.129 Justice O’Connor compared the University of
Michigan Law School plan with the Harvard Law School
admissions policy that Justice Powell approved in Bakke.130
Michigan’s plan was not “racial balancing” because there was no
numeric goal but rather a philosophical “critical mass.”131
Although there may be other means to achieve a critical mass,
narrow tailoring does not require the exhaustion of all raceneutral options.132 The Court expected that in twenty-five years,
race would not have to be used in university admissions
policies.133 Race-based admissions policies should be periodically
reviewed and eliminated as necessary.134
Justice Thomas’s dissent quoted Frederick Douglass:
“[C]olored people” should be given “not benevolence, not pity, not
sympathy, but simply justice.”135 He agreed with the majority’s
holding that racial discrimination will be illegal in twenty-five
years because it was illegal at that time.136 Thomas concurred on
two points. First, racial discrimination between groups within
the “critical mass” remains unlawful.137 Second, “in 25 years the
practices of the Law School will be illegal” for the same reasons
that they were illegal.138

126
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Id. at 328.
Id. at 332.
128
Id. at 339–40.
129
Id. at 334–35.
130
Id. at 335.
131
Id. at 336.
132
“Narrow tailoring” is required, but the most narrowly tailored method is not
required. Id. at 339.
133
Id. at 343.
134
Id. at 342–43.
135
Id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136
See id. at 351.
137
Id. at 374–75.
138
Id. at 375.
127
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Twenty-five years earlier,139 Justice Powell wrote the
plurality opinion in Bakke. Justice O’Connor borrowed heavily
from that opinion, and her forward-looking twenty-five year
language did not end up in the majority opinion by accident.
Scholars have speculated on possible reasons for the twenty-five
year language, including a desire to legitimize the Court.140
Some have interpreted this as a call to finally end racial
injustice;141 others criticize this as an arbitrary time limit.142
The academic achievement gap between racial groups is not
likely to disappear in twenty-five years,143 and affirmative action
disincentivizes minorities from improving their LSAT scores.144
If the twenty-five year window is intended to mitigate the
majority’s damage to strict scrutiny, future applicants will not
find solace in knowing that Justice Powell’s basic protection is
suspended for a full quarter century.145
B.

Gratz v. Bollinger

The University of Michigan’s undergraduate admission
policy awarded applicants twenty points out of one hundred
possible points for belonging to an underrepresented minority
group.146 Applicants belonging to nonminority groups who were
denied admission sought injunctive relief for violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.147
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139
Note that no direct discussion of Justice O’Connor’s twenty-five year
language appears in the Gratz opinion. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003).
140
Vijay S. Sekhon, Maintaining the Legitimacy of the High Court:
Understanding the “25 Years” in Grutter v. Bollinger, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 359,
360 (2004).
141
Wendy B. Scott, Panel Commentary Twenty-Five Years: The Future of
Affirmative Action, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2053, 2060 (2004).
142
Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21
CONST. COMMENT. 171, 183–84 (2004).
143
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 376 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
144
Id. at 377.
145
Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 256 (2003).
147
Id. at 250–51.
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Here, the Court found the university’s admissions policy was
unconstitutional.148 Grutter established binding precedent that
the university’s interest in classroom diversity satisfied the
“compelling state interest” prong of the strict scrutiny test.149
However, this admissions policy did not satisfy the “narrowly
tailored” prong of the strict scrutiny test.150 The admissions
policy lacked the individualized consideration first articulated in
Bakke.151 The ability for an admissions officer to flag an
application for review did not make the policy narrowly tailored
because the award of twenty points was dispositive in many
cases.152 The Michigan undergraduate admissions policy failed
because it lacked nonracial distinctions between minority
applicants.153
The dissent in Gratz noted that “we are not far distant from
an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of lawsanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our
communities and schools.”154 Though indirect, this is perhaps the
closest that the Gratz decision comes to referencing O’Connor’s
twenty-five year language from Grutter.155
V.
A.

FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

Lower Court Decisions


148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 268–76.
Id. at 268–70.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 273.
See id. at 273–74.
Id. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 631 F.3d 213, 216–17 (5th Cir.

157
Id. at 247. The court held that, rather than seeking outright racial balancing
for its own sake, the university’s policy was supported by the compelling interest of
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Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (“Fisher I”) was
brought in the Western District of Texas, which granted
summary judgment to the university, finding that the University
of Texas (“UT”) had correctly applied the constitutional standard
established in Grutter v. Bollinger and UT’s consideration of race
as one admissions factor was narrowly tailored to support a
compelling interest.156 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.157
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The Fifth Circuit applied strict scrutiny while giving
deference to the judgment of the university administrators and
declined to evaluate Fisher’s Title VII claims.158 The court
affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the
university.159 The Fifth Circuit synthesized three objectives for a
critical mass of diversity160: enhanced perspectives,161
professionalism, and civic engagement.162 To increase minorities
in leadership positions, higher education must be open and
inclusive of all qualified individuals of any race.163 The Fifth
Circuit identified these as worthy objectives, as long as they were
narrowly tailored, that is, a holistic evaluation of each
applicant.164
After Hopwood IV, UT had incorporated the personal
achievement index (“PAI”) to be used in conjunction with the
academic index.165 The PAI was meant to “identify and reward
students whose merit as applicants was not adequately reflected
by their class rank and test scores.”166 Though facially neutral, it
was designed to increase minority enrollment as many of the
factors used in the PAI disproportionately affect minority
applicants.167 Despite the implementation of the PAI, minority
applications immediately decreased, and there was a
corresponding decrease in minority enrollment. After Hopwood,
African-American enrollment dropped forty percent and Hispanic
enrollment decreased by five percent. In the same period,
Caucasian enrollment increased by fourteen percent and
Asian-American enrollment increased by twenty percent.168
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achieving critical mass. Id. at 234–38. The court also found that the Texas Top Ten
Percent Plan was not a constitutionally mandated replacement for the university’s
policies and that the critical mass the university sought with its policies had not yet
been achieved. Id. at 245.
158
Id. at 231–32.
159
Id. at 217.
160
Id. at 219.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 219–20.
163
Id. at 220.
164
Id. at 220–21.
165
Id. at 223.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 224.
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Id.
Id.
171
Id. at 224–25.
172
Id. at 225.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 225–26.
176
Id. at 226.
177
Id.
178
Id. (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594 (W.D.
Tex. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179
Id. at 227–28.
170
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Also after Hopwood IV, the Texas legislature enacted the
Top Ten Percent Plan, which automatically admitted Texas
residents in the top ten percent of their high school class to state
universities.169 This increased minority percentages at UT
because of the demographics of the State of Texas.170 Hopwood
IV’s prohibition on using race ended after the 2004 admissions
cycle with the Court’s decision in Grutter.171
“UT commissioned two studies to explore whether the
university was enrolling a critical mass of underrepresented
minorities,” such that a Grutter-like system was unnecessary.172
The university incorporated these findings into the 2004
Proposal To Consider Race and Ethnicity in Admissions.173 The
plan proposed that a “comprehensive college education requires a
robust exchange of ideas, exposure to differing cultures, [and]
preparation[s] for . . . an increasingly diverse workforce.”174 The
proposal observed that these objectives were important to UT
Austin as the flagship University of Texas.175 The results of the
studies and of the objectives of the proposal caused UT to adopt
race as one of the many factors used in admission.176 In addition
to adding race as a factor, the university instituted informal
reviews of the admissions procedure each year.177 The current
Grutter-like policy has produced noticeable results; the UT
system is ranked “sixth in the nation in producing undergraduate
degrees for minority groups.”178 The current program is a tiered
system where the Top Ten Percent Plan is used first, and the AI
and the PAI winnow out the remaining applicants; race is one of
the factors used in the PAI.179
Given that UT’s admissions program differentiates between
applicants on the basis of race, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and
to withstand it, one must show that its policy is narrowly tailored
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Id. at 231.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 231–32.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 232–33.
Id. at 233.
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 234 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003)).
Id. at 235.
Id.
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to effectuate a compelling state interest.180 However, the Court
has counseled deference to a university’s educational judgment
when evaluating race-based government action.181 The Fifth
Circuit determined that strict scrutiny with “a degree of
deference to the University’s . . . academic judgment” was
appropriate, and the university’s decision-making process must
be scrutinized under the good faith consideration of Grutter.182
Grutter recognized that courts must afford a measure of
deference to a university’s educational judgment, and the court
must make this good faith determination that certain raceconscious measures are necessary to achieve the benefits of
diversity including attaining critical mass.183
In deciding so, the Fifth Circuit determined that Fisher’s
Title VII challenge did not apply to university admissions.184
However, because university admissions treat race as part of a
holistic consideration, this does not apply in the same way.185 In
both Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education186 and City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.187 quotas were used, and in Ricci v.
DeStefano188 a de facto quota was created.189 Conversely, no
quota was present in UT’s admissions decisions.190
Given that “diversity is a permissible goal for educational
institutions, but ‘outright racial balancing’ is not[,] [a]ttempting
to ensure that the student body contains some specified
percentage of a particular racial group is ‘patently
unconstitutional.’ ”191 It was clear that administrators know a
quota system would not survive judicial review.192 The UT
administration carefully fashioned its plan with guidance from
Grutter and ensured that each individuals were evaluated on the
entirety of their application.193 There was no indication that the
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Id. at 237.
Id. at 238–42.
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plan was a quota by another name.194 The university did not
even keep “an ongoing tally of racial composition of the entering
class” during the admission period.195
The percentage of
minorities admitted did not support the appellant’s charge of
racial balancing.196 Although race could enhance an applicant’s
PAI score, every applicant could submit supplemental
information to highlight his or her potential diversity
Any consideration of minority group
contribution.197
demographics happened only when the university studied
whether a race-conscious admission program was needed to
attain critical mass.198
The Fifth Circuit held that UT policies demonstrated
attention to the community it serves as the flagship state
university.199 Both in Grutter and Fisher II, the relationship
between numbers and diversity was recognized, however the
court held that UT appropriately concentrated on the educational
benefits.200 The need for a state’s leading educational institution
to foster engagement and maintain openly visible paths to
leadership for minorities required a degree of attention to the
community, including demographics.201
The Fifth Circuit evaluated the Top Ten Percent Plan
because it also impacts minority enrollment.202 The appellants
attempted to portray the Top Ten Percent Plan as a racially
neutral alternative that would provide critical mass without
resorting to race-conscious admissions.203
Texas applicants outside the top ten percent of their class
are faced with extreme competition to enroll at UT.204 This
system negatively impacts minority students who have lower
standardized test scores and are in the second decile of their
classes at competitive high schools.205 Grutter’s—and UT’s—allencompassing look at an application may soften the exclusion of
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minorities based on their standardized test scores.206 Though the
Top Ten Percent Plan was adopted to increase minority
enrollment, its blunt sweep of admissions is the opposite of an
individualized, holistic focus.207 Appellants correctly noted that
enacting this plan was not constitutionally required, however the
Fifth Circuit held that this did not make the Grutter-like plan
unconstitutional.208
The Fifth Circuit did not appraise whether combining the
Top Ten Percent Plan and the Grutter-style plan was the best
possible choice. Though racially neutral, the Top Ten Percent
Plan uses demographics to create a proxy for race.209 Appellants
contended that critical mass had already been reached and that
benchmarks should be established, which the Fifth Circuit
rejected.210 The Court in Grutter “pointedly refused to tie the
concept of ‘critical mass’ to any fixed number.”211 Appellants did
not show that UT did not act in good faith and it was also
apparent from the 2004 proposal that UT had considered
whether aggregate minority enrollment translated to diversity in
the classroom.212 The Fifth Circuit determined that Grutter’s
precedent supported UT’s plans and that it was not their role to
move away from Grutter’s firm holding that diversity is a
compelling state interest.213
B.

The Supreme Court Decision
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Id.
Id. at 242.
208
Id. at 243.
209
Id. at 240.
210
Id. at 242–45.
211
Id. at 244.
212
Id. at 245–46.
213
Id. at 247.
214
Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013). It is interesting to note that Justices
Roberts and Alito did not protest the essence of the majority opinion the way that
Justices Scalia and Thomas protested. As conservative Justices appointed postGrutter, their acquiescence to the majority opinion suggests that they do not
fundamentally challenge Grutter’s central holding, unlike Justices Scalia and
207
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In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (“Fisher II”),
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, with Justices Alito,
Roberts, Sotomayor, and Breyer; Justices Scalia and Thomas
concurred, but wrote separately; and Justice Ginsburg
dissented.214 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion has three parts.
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Thomas who vociferously dissented in Grutter. Fisher II can be seen as a resounding
announcement that classroom diversity is a compelling state interest.
215
Id. at 2415.
216
Id. at 2415–19.
217
Id. at 2415–17.
218
Id. at 2417–19.
219
Id. at 2419–22.
220
Id. at 2415.
221
Id.
222
Id. at 2417–19.
223
Id. at 2417.
224
Id. at 2418.
225
Id. at 2417.
226
Id. at 2418.
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First, the prefatory language introduces the procedural posture
and frames the issue.215
Second, part I states facts and
216
Part I, section A details UT’s various
introduces law.
affirmative action plans over the last twenty years,217 while part
I, section B speaks about Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence,
specifically in the race and affirmative action context.218 Finally,
part II applies the facts to the law and concludes that the Fifth
Circuit erred because it did not properly apply the narrow
tailoring prong of strict scrutiny analysis.219
Kennedy introduced the procedural posture of the case;
generally, the petitioners complained that UT’s use of race in
admissions decisions violated the Equal Protection Clause.220
Further, Kennedy framed the exact issue: whether the judgment
below was consistent with Grutter and Bakke.221
Part I, section B of Justice Kennedy’s opinion discusses
Three
applicable Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.222
cornerstone decisions involving racial classifications in education
are Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz.223 Justice Powell’s plurality
opinion in Bakke held that all governmental decisions based on
race are reviewable under Fourteenth Amendment strict
scrutiny.224 Race-conscious admissions policies do not qualify as
a “[r]edressing past discrimination” compelling state interest
because a school’s academic mission is incompatible with the
making of executive, legislative, or judicial findings of
constitutional violations, which require remediation.225 Justice
Powell cautioned, however, that the attainment of a diverse
student body is complex, and diversity can certainly not be
reduced to a simple numerical value.226
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Id. at 2421.
Id. at 2419 (alterations in original) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989)) (internal quotation mark omitted). “[J]udicial review
must begin from the position that ‘any official action that treats a person differently
on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect.’ ” Id. at 2419 (quoting
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
229
Id. at 2419–22.
230
Id. at 2419.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 2420.
236
Id.
228
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Grutter and Gratz are affirmations of Justice Powell’s
opinion in Bakke, but none of those cases gave university officials
complete freedom to consider race: Admissions policies must
always withstand strict scrutiny with regard to narrow tailoring
and compelling state interest.227 Courts must always begin with
the presumption that racial classifications are inherently suspect
and the government must prove its interests in a “[racial]
classification [are] clearly identified and unquestionably
legitimate.”228
Part II of the opinion applies these facts to the law.229 Strict
scrutiny must be used to review any admissions program in
which race is used as a factor.230 Speaking to the compelling
state interest prong, Justice Kennedy wrote that although
educators have deference when making admission decisions,
courts must ensure there is a principled, reasoned explanation
for the decision.231 Justice Kennedy also noted that no party
asked the Court to review the validity of Grutter.232 Thus,
Grutter’s central holding remained intact.233
Regarding the narrow tailoring prong, Justice Kennedy
further opined that racial balancing—seeking a specific number
or percentage of a minority group—is unconstitutional.234 When
applying the narrow tailoring prong, courts must engage in
“careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve
sufficient diversity without using racial classifications.”235
A court must be satisfied that “no workable race-neutral
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity,”
which the government bears the burden of demonstrating.236
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Id. at 2420–21.
Id. at 2421.
239
Id. at 2421 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9
(1982)).
240
Id. at 2422.
241
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
242
Id. at 2422–29.
243
Id. at 2429–31.
244
Id. at 2430–32.
245
Id. at 2422.
246
Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995)).
247
Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
248
Id. at 2422–23.
238
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Justice Kennedy attacked the deference the Fifth Circuit
gave UT to prove its admissions plan was narrowly tailored
enough to survive strict scrutiny.237 Courts may not accept a
school’s assertion that its admissions process used race in a
permissible way without closely analyzing the evidence of how
the plan works in practice.238 The narrow tailoring prong of strict
scrutiny never changes, no matter how compelling the state
interest may be.239 For this reason, the Court vacated the
judgment and sent the case back to the Fifth Circuit for review
under the correct standard.240
Justice Thomas concurred that the Fifth Circuit incorrectly
applied strict scrutiny; however, he wrote separately to explain
why he would overrule Grutter.241 Justice Thomas explained that
his rationale stemmed from Brown v. Board of Education.242 He
discredited the arguments made in favor of affirmative action by
comparing them to arguments made by segregationists.243
Justice Thomas denounceed “benign” racism and explained how
affirmative action hurts the minorities that it purportedly
helps.244
Justice Thomas explored the history of strict scrutiny
jurisprudence, starting with the Fourteenth Amendment.245 The
central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to require the
government treat all citizens equally.246 Justice Thomas argued
the use of race by the government demeans all people and is
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.247
Justice Thomas traced the origin of strict scrutiny to
Korematsu v. United States.248 He noted two instances—besides
Grutter—where the Court recognized “pressing public
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249
Justice Thomas refered to compelling state interests as “pressing public
necessit[ies].” Id. at 2423 n.1.
250
Id. (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944)).
251
Id. (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500, 504
(1989)).
252
Id.
253
Id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
254
Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270–71 (1986)).
255
Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
256
Id. at 2424.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003)).
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necessity”249 that can constitute a compelling state interest:
protecting
national
security250
and
remedying
past
251
Justice Thomas also noted cases where the
discrimination.
Court rejected purported compelling state interests.252 First, the
Court held that the government could not use race when
determining the best interests of the child because “[p]rivate
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect.”253 Second, providing role
models for children did not constitute compelling state interest.254
Finally, the notion that “black students are better off with black
teachers” was rejected in Brown.255
Justice Thomas also noted that Grutter was a radical
departure from strict scrutiny precedents because it did not
concern protecting a national security or remedying specific past
racial discrimination.256 Rather, the Court deferred to the
University of Michigan Law School’s bald statement that
considering race was necessary in order to obtain the educational
benefits that flow from a diverse student body.257 But there is
nothing “pressing” or “necessary” about obtaining educational
benefits from a diverse student body.258
Justice Thomas refuted UT’s arguments in favor of its
race-conscious admissions policy. UT claimed its discrimination
furthered two distinct interests: diversity for its own sake and
the educational benefits that flow from attaining diversity.259
But diversity for its own sake is a nonstarter because it amounts
to “impermissible ‘racial balancing.’ ”260
Furthermore, the
educational benefits that flow from attaining diversity are just as
insufficient to support racial discrimination as the purported
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Id.
Id. at 2424–25.
263
Id. at 2425 (citing Davis v. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 347 U.S. 483
(1954)).
264
347 U.S. 483.
265
Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2425.
266
Id. at 2426–27 (citing Brief for Respondents at 96, Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44), 1950 WL 78682, at *96; Brief for Appellees at 32, Briggs v.
Elliott, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1), 1952 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 11, at *50).
267
Id. at 2426.
268
Id. at 2428.
269
Id.
270
Id. at 2429–30.
271
Id. at 2430.
272
Id.
262
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educational benefits that flowed from segregation.261 Justice
Thomas set up this part of the opinion by citing Brown and
compared the illegality of segregation to the illegality of
affirmative action.262
The desegregation cases rejected the proposition that racial
discrimination was necessary even if discrimination was
necessary to the schools’ survival.263 The school board in Brown’s
companion case, Davis v. School Board of Prince Edward
County,264 had unsuccessfully argued that integration would have
destroyed the quality of education that blacks received and forced
schools to close, and that blacks would be the real victims of
desegregation.265 Justice Thomas observed other cases where
this argument failed.266 Indeed, the school closures Davis warned
about eventually became reality, but the Court never retreated
from its antidiscrimination principle.267
Justice Thomas found that there was no rational difference
between the form of racial discrimination advanced by the
segregationists and the racial discrimination advanced by UT.268
“Educational benefits are a far cry” from the compelling state
interest necessary to justify the governmental use of race.269
Justice Thomas cited slaveholder arguments that slavery
helped to “civilize” blacks and elevated them as a race.270 In
addition, segregationists argued the Jim Crow laws protected
blacks from racist whites and “separate schools were in the ‘best
interests’ of both races.”271 UT wanted the Court to accept the
arguments of the slaveholder and the segregationist, but we
know that “[r]acial discrimination is never benign.”272 The Court
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Id. (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005)).
Id. at 2431.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id. at 2432.
278
Id.
279
Id. (“In this case, for example, most blacks and Hispanics attending the
University were admitted without discrimination under the Top Ten Percent plan,
but no one can distinguish those students from the ones whose race played a role in
their admission.”).
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
Id. at 2432–33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
283
Id.
284
Id. at 2433.
274
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has held that all racial discrimination must be analyzed under
strict scrutiny, even when the government has benevolent
motives.273
Justice Thomas explained that while UT’s plan harms both
white and Asian students by denying them equal admissions
standards, great harm is also done to those people admitted to
UT under its plan.274 Blacks and Hispanics admitted to UT
outside of the Top Ten Percent Plan are far less prepared than
other applicants and have lower average GPAs and SAT scores.275
Stunningly, UT and its amici never disproved the fact that
minorities academically perform poorer than their peers and
pursue less rigorous paths of study.276
Finally, the plan stamped minorities with a lingering “badge
of inferiority.”277 Their accomplishments were tainted by the
notion that they were only admitted because of their race.278
Furthermore, because there is no way to distinguish applicants
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Plan and the PAI plan, all
minority applicants suffer this fate.279 Justice Thomas concluded
However,
by repeating that he would overrule Grutter.280
because the Fifth Circuit did not correctly apply strict scrutiny,
Justice Thomas concurred in the majority opinion.281
Justice Ginsburg started her dissent by noting that UT
modeled its admissions plan after the Harvard Plan that Justice
Powell praised in Bakke.282 Furthermore, UT avoided quotas as
required by Bakke and Gratz.283 Finally, Justice Ginsburg
explained that UT and many other schools were sticking closely
to what Grutter required.284
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Justice Ginsburg quoted her own dissenting opinions from
the Gratz and Adarand decisions for the proposition that
governmental actors—including universities—“need not be blind
to the lingering effects of ‘an overtly discriminatory past.’ ”285 It
is better that the government candidly discloses its use of race,
rather than obfuscate its use.286
She noted that race is
considered only as a factor, that the school went on a yearlong
good-faith review period before instituting the policy, and that
the school periodically reviews the necessity of the policy.287
Nothing else was required by the Court’s precedents to satisfy
the narrow-tailoring prong.288
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the majority did one thing
right: It retained the central holding of Grutter.289 However,
Justice Ginsburg affirmed because she found it unnecessary to
send the case for further review.290
C.

Remand to the Fifth Circuit
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285
Id. (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)).
286
Id.
287
Id. at 2434.
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Id. at 2421 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Court of Appeals must assess whether
the University has offered sufficient evidence . . . that its admissions program is
narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity.”).
292
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher III), 758 F.3d 633, 660 (5th Cir.
2014).
293
Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2419.
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After the close of Fisher II at the Supreme Court, the
judgment was vacated and remanded to the Fifth Circuit for
more exacting scrutiny of the university’s diversity efforts.291 The
Fifth Circuit reheard oral arguments, received additional briefing
on the situation, reexamined with additional scrutiny as per the
Court’s orders, and a divided panel—two-to-one—reaffirmed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment.292
Though the Court ordered the Fifth Circuit not to defer to
the university’s explanations or rationales, and the Fifth Circuit
had closely examined both the admissions policies of the
university and the facts of Fisher’s case, it nevertheless failed to
“ensure that there is a reasoned, principled explanation for the
academic decision” as per Grutter.293 In the Fifth Circuit’s
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Fisher III, 758 F.3d at 637–39.
Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2415.
Fisher III, 758 F.3d at 638–39.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640–42.
Id. at 642.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978).
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defense, while Grutter and Bakke are still good law, this directive
is unworkable and requires the court to take on the roles of social
scientist, statistician, and God to make a determination whether
UT Austin’s—or any university’s—plan would be acceptable. In
the majority opinion, the court took a close look at the evolution
of the admissions program at UT Austin and examined Fisher’s
claims in depth; the court strictly scrutinized the changes in
demographics effectuated by each admissions program.294
The opinion is divided up between review of the university’s
admissions policies, whether the case should be remanded back
to the district court, an analysis of the standard from Grutter and
an application of the Fisher II facts to the Grutter standard, as
well as an in depth explanation of the difficulties of applying the
“critical mass” with any certainty.295 The increased scrutiny that
the Court ordered was shown in the Fifth Circuit review of the
Top Ten Percent Plan, the academic index, the personal
achievement index (“AI” and “PAI”) scores, and the holistic
review of the application. The Fifth Circuit concluded that
Fisher would not have been admitted to the university under any
The Fifth Circuit addressed the “factual
of her scores.296
developments since summary judgment” and questioned whether
Fisher had standing to pursue this case any longer.297 The Fifth
Circuit found that Fisher did have standing to review and denied
the university’s motion for remand to the district court.298 The
Fifth Circuit set out its task from the Court: “In remanding, the
Supreme Court held that its decision in Grutter requires that
‘strict scrutiny must be applied to any admissions program using
racial categories or classifications’; that ‘racial classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests.’ ”299 The Fifth Circuit then
examined the different admissions programs in the light of
Justice Powell’s conclusion, “attainment of a diverse student
body . . . is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of
higher education,”300 which was stated in Bakke but endorsed by
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Id.
Fisher III, 758 F.3d at 643.
Id. at 644 (alterations in original).
Id.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 647–49.
Id. at 660.
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both Grutter and Fisher II.301 The court discussed the difficulty
of attaining diversity without the usage of quotas and while
maintaining the richness of experiences and other characteristics
that can impact diversity without being deemed “outright racial
balancing.”302 A university will receive no deference on whether
the “means chosen to accomplish the [university’s] asserted
purpose . . . be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish
that purpose.”303 This narrow tailoring requirement mandates
that a university demonstrate that it attempted to implement
race-neutral policies to effectuate the same goals before using
race.304
In order to assess whether the narrow tailoring was present,
the circuit court began with Hopwood IV and traced the evolution
of the Top Ten Percent Plan and the impacts that it had, namely
admitting more white students than minorities.305 The court
found that the demographics of the State of Texas, the Top Ten
Percent Plan, and the holistic review operated to lower the
These
number of minorities after their implementation.306
realities highlight the difficulty of an approach that seeks to
couch the concept of “critical mass” within numerical terms. The
court rehashed the process of how the university’s admission
policy had come to be and commended the university’s efforts and
constant restructuring of the program to maintain diversity,
though diversity is difficult to define.307 The majority held that
“[t]o reject the UT Austin plan is to confound developing
principles of neutral affirmative action, looking away from Bakke
and Grutter, leaving them in uniform but without command—due
only a courtesy salute in passing.”308 This quote sets the stage for
this case to return to a higher court, and with the return of this
unsatisfyingly derivative ruling, perhaps the Court will be forced
to clarify the framework promulgated by Grutter v. Bollinger.
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Id.
Id. at 661 (Garza, J., dissenting).
Id. at 665.
Id. at 666.
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UT has implemented a Grutter-like plan, using race as only
one factor in its holistic review, but “this record of its necessary
use of race in a holistic process and the want of workable
alternatives that would not require even greater use of race,
faithful to the content given to it by the Supreme Court.”309
The dissent blasted both the majority and UT for having the
undefined “critical mass” as the goal of the university’s diversity
efforts.310 Circuit Judge Garza dissented again in this case, his
major qualm with the majority being that they have yet again
failed to strictly scrutinize the admissions policy, as it is
impossible to do so without a clear understanding of the
university’s “compelling interest” in diversity.311 Because the
Court clarified the strict scrutiny standard as applicable to racial
classifications in higher education, but reviewing courts cannot
defer to a state actor’s argument that its consideration of race is
narrowly tailored to achieve its diversity goals, the court is in a
difficult quandary of how to balance the school’s goals with the
lack of deference. Judge Garza noted that a public university
could define its end goal adequately, but UT had not done so.312
Given the extensive research and trial and error undertaken
by UT since 1997, it is difficult to imagine a more arduous
process to gain such a nebulous result. After this decision, it
seems the only possibilities are to appeal to the Fifth Circuit to
review en banc or to go back to the Supreme Court. The
difficulty expressed in Judge Garza’s dissent is perhaps the crux
of the issue—it is difficult for lower courts to apply the ends and
means analysis. Additionally, because courts cannot truly assess
whether the use of racial classifications are necessary and
narrowly tailored to a university’s goals, cases like Fisher are
destined to hang in limbo until the Court decrees definitive
guidelines that can be applied by lower courts.
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VI. SCHUETTE V. COALITION TO
DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A.

Lower Court History
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313
Mary Pat Dwyer, Petition of the Day, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 21, 2013, 10:36
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/petition-of-the-day-422/.
314
James Taranto, The Woman Who Fought Racial Preference, WALL ST. J.,
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732341960457857004195716554
4 (last updated Jun. 28, 2013, 7:06 PM).
315
Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F.
Supp. 2d 924, 931 (E.D. Mich. 2008), aff’d, 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S.
Ct. 1623 (2014).
316
Id. at 932; see MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
317
Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
318
Id. at 960.
319
Id. at 944.
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The question certified for review in Schuette is “whether a
state violates the Equal Protection Clause by amending its
constitution to prohibit race- and sex-based discrimination or
preferential
treatment
in
public-university
admissions
Although Schuette belongs to the family of
decisions.”313
affirmative action Supreme Court cases, the case has presented
some unique issues.
Over the years, Michigan has become a laboratory for
affirmative action litigation. The controversies surrounding
Gratz and Grutter both originated in the Wolverine State,
Michigan. Following those decisions, the Gratz lead plaintiff,
Jennifer Gratz, spearheaded a ballot challenge to affirmative
action programs in Michigan.314 Gratz and her associates placed
Proposition 2 (“Prop 2”) on the ballot, which “bar[red] programs
for state school admission, public employment, and public
contracting [from] grant[ing] preferential treatment on the basis
Although proponents faced initial
of race or gender.”315
difficulties, Prop 2 passed and went into effect on December 23,
2006.316
Litigation ensued: Interest groups brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan.317 The district court made several findings and
ultimately found Prop 2 constitutionally permissible.318 First, the
opponents of Prop 2 did not have standing to challenge the law
on First Amendment grounds.319 Second, Prop 2 did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause because it did not have a
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discriminatory purpose,320 nor did Prop 2 violate the equal
protection rights of minority applicants under the “political
process” theory.321 Finally, the district court held that neither
Title VII nor Title IX preempted Prop 2, because neither law
requires preferential treatment for minority groups for the state
to receive federal funding.322
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed.323 Upon rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit
held that Prop 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
made the processes of government decision making turn on the
racial nature of the issue being considered.324
In addressing the issues, the Sixth Circuit did not evaluate
“the constitutional status or relative merits of race-conscious
admissions policies as such.”325 This court did not evaluate Prop
2 under a traditional equal protection analysis because it found
that the political-process doctrine had been violated which was to
find Prop 2 unconstitutional.326 The Court used the tests found
in the cases of Hunter and Seattle that emphasized that the
Equal Protection Clause is a guarantee that minorities may
participate meaningfully in the political process and ensures that
The Court
the political process is fair for all players.327
explained:
[A law] deprives minority groups of the equal protection of the
laws when it: (1) has a racial focus, targeting a policy or
program that ‘inures primarily to the benefit of the minority’;

320
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Id. at 953.
Id. at 957–58; see Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 387 (1968) (holding that
a referendum to require the approval of an electoral majority before any ordinance
regulating real estate “on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or
ancestry” was unconstitutional); see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457, 472 (1982) (holding that the initiative that prohibited mandatory busing
which “inure[d] primarily to the benefit of the minority” was unconstitutional
because it reallocated political power unfairly).
322
Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 959.
323
Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 652 F.3d
607, 610 (6th Cir. 2011), superseded on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2012),
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
324
Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d
466, 470 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
325
Id. at 473.
326
Id. at 485.
327
Id. at 474.
321
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and (2) reallocates political power or reorders the
decisionmaking process in a way that places special burdens on
a minority [group].328

The Court further found that the program had a racial focus
because the admissions policies, which Prop 2 banned, “inure[d]
primarily to the benefit of the [racial] minority.”329 The Court
also found that Prop 2 reordered the political process through the
elected board of directors, which shaped the admissions policies
for the state universities named in the suit.330 In addition, the
only way to change the law was to amend the Michigan State
Constitution, a significant hurdle.331 The Sixth Circuit denied
the State’s contention that Hunter and Seattle were inapplicable
to Prop 2 because those cases governed “enactments that burden
racial minorities’ ability to obtain protection from discrimination”
instead of minorities’ ability “to obtain preferential treatment.”332
B.

The Supreme Court Decision



C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

328
Id. at 477 (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472
(1982)).
329
Id. at 479.
330
Id. at 480.
331
Id. at 484.
332
Id. at 485.
333
Schuette v. Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630 (2014).
334
Id. at 1638.
335
Id.
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Although the Court explicitly stated that this case was not
an indication of the merits of race-conscious admissions policies
in higher education,333 the implications of this case will have far
reaching effects on race-conscious policies, educational or
otherwise. The importance of this issue is highlighted by the
plurality opinion, with most Justices putting their opinions on
the record. Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, held that
no constitutional authority would allow the judiciary to set aside
an amendment to the Michigan Constitution prohibiting
affirmative action in public education, employment, and
contracting.334 Chief Justice Roberts concurred, Justices Scalia
and Thomas concurred in judgment separately, Justice Breyer
concurred in judgment separately, and Justice Sotomayor
dissented with Justice Ginsburg joining her. Justice Kagan did
not take part in the decision.335
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The Court took special care to distinguish this case from
Fisher before delving into this case. In the Court’s short opinion,
Justice Kennedy explained why the cases used in the lower court
did not apply to Prop 2.336 The three cases discussed by the
plurality were Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,337
Hunter v. Erickson,338 and Reitman v. Mulkey.339 Seattle and
Hunter led the Sixth Circuit to decide that section 26 was
unconstitutional based on the political-process doctrine.340 In
Hunter, Mulkey, and Seattle, insular groups were injured by
legislation.341 The political-process doctrine is triggered when a
law reallocates policymaking authority on a racial issue, the first
prong of the analysis. At that point, the Court must determine
whether the law will put the “effective decisionmaking authority
over . . . racial issue[s] at a different level of government,” the
second prong.342 Though the political-process doctrine is linked to
equal protection, the Sixth Circuit incorrectly applied this
standard. The difficulties of applying this standard correctly
made the political-process doctrine inappropriate, as stated by
the Court:
Were courts to embark upon this venture not only would it be
undertaken with no clear legal standards or accepted sources to
guide judicial decision but also it would result in, or at least
impose a high risk of, inquiries and categories dependent upon
demeaning stereotypes, classifications of questionable
constitutionality on their own terms.343


336
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Id. at 1634.
458 U.S. 457 (1982).
338
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
339
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
340
Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d
466, 488–89 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
341
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633.
342
Id. at 1643, 1645 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
343
Id. at 1635 (plurality opinion).
344
Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 488.
337
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The Sixth Circuit read Seattle to hold that a state action
with a racial focus that made it difficult for racial minorities to
effectuate legislation in their interest is subject to strict
scrutiny.344 The Court held that this was an overly expansive
interpretation of Seattle that did not have precedential support
but had troubling implications at odds with established Equal
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Protection Clause jurisprudence.345
Section 26 did not
demonstrate injury as in Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle. The Court
determined that the issue is merely whether “voters may
determine whether a policy of race-based preferences should be
continued.”346 The Court explained that if Seattle were to control,
future courts would be compelled to “determine and declare
which political policies serve the ‘interest’ of a group defined in
racial terms,” something that a court is not equipped to do and
which is at odds with the Constitution.347 In Mulkey, Hunter, and
Seattle, the challenged policies were used, or likely to be used, to
injure citizens by reason of race. The plurality analogized
Schuette to Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson348 and held
that an equal protection analysis was appropriate.349 In Wilson,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that barring racial preferences in public education was
constitutional;350 this ruling would be called into question if the
lower court’s analysis were correct. At issue is whether voters
can determine whether racial preferences may be used, not
whether not addressing or preventing an injury on the basis of
race, is constitutional. The Court distinguished Prop 2:


345
346
347

349
350
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348

Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634.
Id. at 1636.
Id. at 1634.
122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636.
Wilson, 122 F.3d at 702.
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Here Michigan voters acted in concert and statewide to seek
consensus and adopt a policy on a difficult subject against a
historical background of race in America that has been a source
of tragedy and persisting injustice. That history demands that
we continue to learn, to listen, and to remain open to new
approaches if we are to aspire always to a constitutional order
in which all persons are treated with fairness and equal dignity.
Were the Court to rule that the question addressed by Michigan
voters is too sensitive or complex to be within the grasp of the
electorate; or that the policies at issue remain too delicate to be
resolved save by university officials or faculties, acting at some
remove from immediate public scrutiny and control; or that
these matters are so arcane that the electorate’s power must be
limited because the people cannot prudently exercise that power
even after a full debate, that holding would be an
unprecedented restriction on the exercise of a fundamental
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right held not just by one person but by all in common. It is the
right to speak and debate and learn and then, as a matter of
political will, to act through a lawful electoral process.351


351
352
353

355
356
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354

Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637.
Id. at 1638–39 (Roberts, J., concurring).
Id. at 1649–51 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1649–50.
Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1640.
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The takeaway of this opinion was that the Michigan voters
should not be disempowered to decide on a matter of public
importance; Schuette is not a case about how racial preferences
should be resolved, but rather who may resolve them. Schuette’s
plurality opinion is deceptively short, but the differing opinions
of each Justice shed more light on what the Justices believe
should control this case. The Justices are entrenched in their
viewpoints with an unsatisfying resolution overall.
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring, wrote separately to scold
the dissent for having a lengthy opinion and to declare that
“[p]eople can disagree in good faith on this issue, but it similarly
does more harm than good to question the openness and candor
of those on either side of the debate.”352 Justice Breyer’s
concurrence stated that he continues “to believe that the
Constitution permits, though it does not require,” affirmative
action, and though the problems intended to be fixed by
affirmative action endure, the political-process doctrine does not
fit the facts at hand.353 Further, Justice Breyer would allow the
workings of democracy to take their course instead of overturning
them by judicial decree.354
Justice Scalia concurred in judgment with this holding,
joined by Justice Thomas, writing an opinion full of fire and
brimstone in support of the holding but disagreeing with the
rationale of the case; he thought it was ludicrous that the Court
considered the question presented.355 Justice Scalia agreed with
the plurality that the political-process doctrine, established by
Hunter and Seattle, was not the appropriate standard, but he
would have gone further and overturned those cases as contrary
to equal protection jurisprudence.356 The plurality reinterpreted
those decisions to support their conclusion, whereas Justice
Scalia would have simply reaffirmed that equal protection
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Id.
Id. at 1643.
Id. at 1644.
Id. at 1646–47.
Id. at 1648.
Id. at 1653–54 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1654–57.
Id. at 1656–59.
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violations require a showing of discriminatory intent.357 The
issue Justice Scalia found with regard to the political-process
doctrine was that it gives courts too much leeway in finding a
“racial issue.”358 Additionally, Justice Scalia opined that the
plurality misinterpreted the Equal Protection Clause as applying
to groups instead of all persons.359 The second prong of the
political-process doctrine conflicts with the idea of state
sovereignty and would create a reverse preemption effect by
preventing states from delegating decision-making authority to
any subordinate entity. Justice Scalia’s concurrence criticized
the dissent’s notion that the existing political process has been
changed, because the voters in Michigan had used the
Justice Scalia would have
established political process.360
explicitly reaffirmed that discriminatory purposes must be shown
for an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment;
and he would have held that a facially neutral law such as
section 26 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment without a showing of discriminatory
intent.361
The dissent equated eliminating racial preferences in higher
education with the historical oppression minority groups have
faced in this country. In increasingly hyperbolic tones, Justice
Sotomayor’s lengthy dissent, about how the plurality incorrectly
applied precedent and fundamentally misunderstands the
problem with Prop 2, now section 26, maintained that the
judiciary should have intervened in this case in order to advance
equality.362 Justice Sotomayor took a historical journey through
constitutional law, from the passing of the Fifteenth Amendment
and the history of reconstruction-era legislation to the hurdles
faced by minorities in the political process.363 In this historical
framework, Justice Sotomayor defended the political-process
doctrine that the plurality was eager to disregard.364 The dissent
contended that Schuette is like Hunter and Seattle, and similarly,
a majority of voters may not “suppress the minority’s right to
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Id. at 1657, 1659.
Id. at 1659–60.
Id. at 1652.
Id. at 1683.
Id.
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participate on equal terms in the political process.”365 The
dissent equated section 26 with the racially-motivated legislation
in Hunter and Seattle and would overturn section 26.366 Justice
Sotomayor contended that the enactment of section 26 has
“changed the basic rules of the political process . . . in a manner
that uniquely disadvantaged racial minorities.”367 Though she
noted that after Grutter voters were free to pursue the end of
affirmative action in a number of ways, she took issue with their
amendment of the state constitution. Her dissent seems to decry
section 26 because of personal feelings and not on legal
precedent. Her argument for how the amendment unfairly
burdened racial minorities is premised on the fact that alumni of
the University of Michigan can lobby to change admissions
policies in ways that would benefit other groups, such as legacy
applicants, while racial minorities hoping to change admissions
policies must now change the state constitution. While there is a
disparity between the difficulties of lobbying a school to change
its policies and lobbying for a change to the state constitution, it
remains that the voters of Michigan enacted this policy. The
democratic system provides for a majority rule and perhaps the
tyranny of the majority should be avoided in some cases, but is
an amendment explicitly outlawing racial preferences that case?
Justice Sotomayor addressed this issue: “The Constitution does
not protect racial minorities from political defeat. But neither
does it give the majority free rein to erect selective barriers
against racial minorities.”368
Justice Sotomayor looked at the impact of affirmative-action
policies and how minority enrollment drops when only raceneutral selection policies are implemented, and she suggested a
parade of horribles of what would happen if race-neutral policies
were used exclusively.369 Her extensive look into the policies was
criticized by the plurality, and her dissent seems to be an
attempt to see what sticks, especially because she ended with
“[t]o be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the virtues of
adopting race-sensitive admissions policies should inform the
legal question before the Court today regarding the
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constitutionality of § 26.”370 This admission makes it seem that
Justice Sotomayor supports the legal analysis of the plurality
and that her issue was with the precedent this case will set.
Justice Sotomayor continued:
The Constitution does not protect racial minorities from
political defeat. But neither does it give the majority free rein
to erect selective barriers against racial minorities.
The
political-process doctrine polices the channels of change to
ensure that the majority, when it wins, does so without rigging
the rules of the game to ensure its success. Today, the Court
discards that doctrine without good reason.371
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373
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Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 771 F.3d 274, 274 (5th Cir. 2014).
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Justice Sotomayor has gone on the record that she would uphold
affirmative action as a public policy matter, however this was not
the case to make that holding.372
Schuette is a fairly straightforward case if the politicalprocess doctrine can be shunted aside and resolved as an equal
protection issue. By involving the political-process doctrine and
the history of discrimination in the United States, what could be
simply resolved devolves into an examination of every wrong and
instance of invidious discrimination in the history of the United
States, all for a case that explicitly deigns not to consider the
constitutionality of affirmative action based on racial
preferences.
This case has established a Supreme Court
sanctioned way for those against affirmative action to dispose of
it neatly and constitutionally. The interplay between deciding
this case as a straightforward equal protection claim, versus the
convoluted and subjective test of the political-process doctrine,
makes this case interesting, but what will be more interesting is
the outcome of affirmative action. As the Fisher case returns
from the Fifth Circuit, the time seems ripe for another challenge
and a call for the Supreme Court to clarify the guidelines of
affirmative action, and for a definitive decision to be reached. On
November 12, 2014, the Fifth Circuit announced that it would
not rehear this case en banc, which means it is headed back to
the Supreme Court.373
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Fisher II and Schuette have tacitly endorsed the operation of
affirmative action in higher education and employment, although
its perch is precarious. After forty years of contentious litigation
in more than a dozen highly charged cases, the Roberts Court
undoubtedly understands the operational parameters of
affirmative action.
Affirmative action is not a perfect
methodology; rather, it is a flawed theory. But, given the reality
of deeply embedded racism and the hyperutility of higher
education as the gatekeeper to professional employment,
affirmative action is an indispensable mechanism to provide the
rough justice of pragmatic political proportionality.
Essentially, the kaleidoscopic panorama of racial groups in
the understandably fair share of tangible benefits accompanied
by professional employment is predicated on successful higher
education. Ergo, the role and the reality of affirmative action
will be a redistributionist tool for the foreseeable future. Rather
than dictate its demise, Fisher II and Schuette may have
solidified affirmative action for well more than the next twentyfive years. Affirmative action is perhaps the most effective
instrument for periodically recalibrating pragmatic, political
proportionality. Because affirmative action is utilized at many
levels, and no other policy instrument has a proven track record,
thus far, there has been no effective equivalent.
Although Fisher II and Schuette left unanswered some
important questions about the status of affirmative action, the
most recent decisions still made important contributions. The
Fisher II decision is significant in several different ways. First,
Fisher II may disincentivize universities from using raceconscious admissions policies. Next, Fisher II is similar to
Adarand because it involves the tightening of a key part of equal
protection analysis. In addition, the Fisher II decision was an
implicit, albeit indirect, prediction of Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action. Fisher II and Schuette are important
milestones on the twenty-five year journey towards the end of
affirmative action.
Though Fisher II may provide an exemplar for universities
looking to enact a constitutionally permissible affirmative action
program, Fisher II will decrease other universities’ willingness to
risk liability for race-conscious admissions policies.
By
continually holding universities’ feet to the fire over
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Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
376
Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
377
The Fisher II majority noted that the Court did not review Grutter’s validity
because no party asked the court to review it. See id. at 2419.
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race-conscious admissions policies, the Court has raised public
universities’ operating costs. Schools risk the threat of high
stakes litigation. As the University of California in Bakke, the
University of Michigan in Grutter and Gratz, and the University
of Texas in Fisher all experienced firsthand, litigation over
admissions policies is a costly and time-consuming endeavor.
Even with pro bono legal assistance from powerful amici,
affirmative action lawsuits can eat away at precious
administrative resources. Further, schools risk negative press
and public backlash from these controversial policies. One
compelling argument may become whether the cost of affirmative
action policies outweigh the purported benefits of such programs.
Finally, the court’s ruling mandates that schools acquiesce in an
even more taxing review process before instituting race-conscious
policies. The time, energy, and manpower devoted to reviewing
these policies will undoubtedly temper universities’ appetite for
affirmative action policies. Perhaps Fisher II is the conservative
pragmatist’s way to eradicate affirmative action.
Similarly to how Metro Broadcasting was flipped by
Adarand, Fisher II transforms the old idea that narrow tailoring
need not mean that every idea be tested into the idea that, in
fact, every race-neutral plan must be thoroughly scrutinized and
reviewed.374 The oft-refrain of pro-affirmative action pundits was
that narrow tailoring does not mean that every race-neutral
alternative must be tried and tested.375 However, Fisher II does
mandate that courts absolutely consider all race-neutral
possibilities. The Fisher II Court tempered Grutter by explaining
that “[c]onsideration by the university is . . . necessary, but it is
not sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny: The reviewing court must
ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives
would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”376 In this
way, affirmative action proponents were dealt a major blow in
Fisher II. Although they claimed victory in the tepid affirmation
of Grutter,377 proponents of affirmative action must realize that
their days are numbered after Schuette. The tightening of the
availability of affirmative action plans in Fisher augured the

375

04/08/2016 13:04:55

C M
Y K

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 80 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_GREGORY

548

4/6/2016 4:03 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:499


378

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHNIC AND RACIAL DISPARITIES
IN EDUCATION: PSYCHOLOGY’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING
DISPARITIES 14 (2012), available at http://www.apa.org/ed/resources/racialdisparities.pdf.
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Court’s ruling in Schuette that affirmative action can be
constitutionally banned by state law.
Schuette is a clear
indication that states retain the right to decide affirmative action
questions.
In tandem, Schuette and Fisher II invite
reexamination of Grutter.
Though Fisher II may receive a cold reception from the legal
academic community for being a “dud,” it is this uncertainty that
makes the case interesting. It certainly was not a gamechanging tectonic shift that transformed constitutional
jurisprudence but Fisher II leaves the central holding of Grutter
intact, while hinting that a direct challenge to Grutter will
change its calculus. Fisher II’s significance will be felt in more
subtle and long-lasting ways; the Fifth Circuit’s decision in this
case leaves the door open for the Supreme Court to affirm
affirmative action or to eviscerate it. The door was left open by
the decision in Schuette as well, which implies that the Court
may allow states to decide on a case-by-case basis.
The long-term outcome and lasting import of these cases
cannot be fully realized until another challenge to affirmative
action is before the Court, but Fisher II is still an important step
towards realizing the end of affirmative action, as predicted by
Justice O’Connor’s famous twenty-five year deadline from
Grutter.378 Although Grutter is cited multiple times in the Fisher
II opinion, Fisher II does not explicitly comment on Justice
O’Connor’s prediction that affirmative action would no longer be
needed in twenty-five years.
Though the official Grutter
prophecy does not expire until 2028, these cases open the door for
change and the next twelve years will certainly bring shifts in
the affirmative action landscape. The educational disparity
between races and social classes is increasing,379 and the need for
some mechanism to ensure that there is an opportunity for all to
reach the highest echelons of education remains. However, the
general tightening of the narrow tailoring prong and tepid
acceptance of Grutter signal that the Court is moving, with
exquisite irony, towards an affirmative action jurisprudence
intolerant of race-conscious admissions plans. Affirmative action
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is in a midlife crisis. Taken together, Fisher II and Schuette
suggest that affirmative action has seen its heyday but is not
over yet. Without tenable guidelines for universities to follow,
the Court leaves open questions in these decisions. The United
States is in the middle of the journey towards Justice O’Connor’s
utopian society, and until then, affirmative action remains the
key to creating political proportionality of racial and economic
minority groups.
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